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Abstract 
 
Crisis does not discriminate. It can strike without warning, at any time or place. Managers, 
organizations, and leaders alike, must be ready at all times to respond to them, whether they are 
planned for or not. An efficient and quick response is especially necessary when health crises or 
natural disasters strike, because human life may be at stake. Crisis communication has become 
more and more important in a world that is daily filled with catastrophes. This study uses W. 
Timothy Coomb’s situational crisis communication theory as a lens to view the Ebola crisis. The 
purpose of the study is to analyze news articles released from the non-profit Samaritan’s Purse 
and conduct interviews to determine the communicative response to the Ebola outbreak from 
both the Liberian healthcare system and the international non governmental organization, 
Samaritan’s Purse. 
 
Keywords: Timothy Coombs, Samaritan’s Purse, Ebola crisis, situational crisis 
communication, Liberia 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Crisis, a word deriving from Latin and Greek, means “an unstable or crucial time or state 
of affairs in which a decisive change is impending” (“Crisis,” n.d.). In 2014, the world sat back 
and watched as the Ebola virus disease (EVD) ripped through the West African nations of Sierra 
Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. In the next two years, 28,600 people would contract EVD and 
11,300 would die (Huster, 2016). Arguably, only two international non-profit organizations 
would respond to an outbreak that quickly spiraled out of control. Ebola became a crisis; during 
this unstable time, in the wake of the disease, were questions concerning communication and 
healthcare.  
 This study will seek to understand how the healthcare system and non-profit Samaritan’s 
Purse responded to the Ebola crisis. In addition to this, it will view the disaster through Coomb’s 
situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), seeking to understand how the loss of life could 
have been prevented or lessened with attention to the communicative response. This project 
requires a brief understanding of Samaritan’s Purse, the West African nation of Liberia, and 
Ebola. 
Samaritan’s Purse 
Samaritan’s Purse is a nondenominational international relief organization that has 
worked in over one hundred countries for the last forty-six years. The organization seeks to 
provide physical and spiritual aid to victims of war, poverty, natural disasters, disease and 
famine (About Us, 2016). Samaritan’s Purse was originally founded by Bob Pierce in 1970 after 
seeing desperate children in Kojedo, Korea (History, 2016).  The original mission of the non-
profit was to “meet emergency needs in crisis areas through existing evangelical mission 
agencies and national churches” (History, 2016). Pierce continued to travel around the world, 
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and Asia, dedicating himself to finding those that were helping the least of these. In 1973, a 
young Franklin Graham, who also had a heart for world missions, met Pierce. Two years later, 
Graham traveled with Pierce to different places around the world, where his eyes were opened to 
people in deep physical and spiritual poverty (History, 2016). Graham would become the 
eventual successor of Bob Pierce, after the man lost a battle to leukemia in 1978. Since then, 
Franklin Graham has acted as the President and Chairman of the Board of Samaritan’s Purse 
(History, 2016). The non-profit is based off of the Biblical account of the good Samaritan in 
Luke 10. “Samaritan’s Purse travels the world’s highways looking for victims along the way. We 
are quick to bandage the wounds we see, but like the Samaritan, we don’t stop there” (History, 
2016). Samaritan’s Purse utmost goal is to aid the hurting in the world and to always point 
people back to the saving Gospel of Jesus Christ. Since it’s founding, Samaritan’s Purse has 
come to the aid of those affected by earthquakes, hurricanes, wars, and famines throughout the 
world (History, 2016). In addition to providing international crisis response, the organization has 
many other programs that serve people around the globe such as Operation Christmas Child, 
World Medical Mission, Great Home and Academy, Animals, Agriculture, and Livelihoods, 
Operation Heal Our Patriots, the Children’s Heart Project, U.S. Disaster Relief, Construction 
Projects, Feeding Programs, Women’s Programs, Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene, Children’s 
Ministries, The Greatest Journey, Discipleship, Education, and Training, Health and Medical 
Ministries, and Human Trafficking Prevention. Each of these programs exist to help those in 
desperate need. Traces of the non-profit’s work can be seen in almost every disaster the world 
has seen, some of the most notable being the Sudanese civil war, the Haiti, Nepal, and Ecuador 
earthquakes, and the most recent refugee crisis in Europe. Since 1970, Samaritan’s Purse has not 
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only offered, help, but the hope of Jesus Christ. Now that a brief background of the non-profit 
has been provided, this work will look at Liberia and its inner conflict. 
Liberian Conflict 
 Situated on the coast of West Africa, Liberia shares a border with the Atlantic Ocean and 
is surrounded by the countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire. Home to 4.2 million 
people, it was founded in 1847 by American and Caribbean slaves that were freed. (Liberia 
country profile, 2016). Sadly, from 1989-2003 the country was wrecked by an internal civil war 
that killed 250,000 citizens, which was sparked by Charles Taylor, a man who began an uprising 
against the government and later became president in 1997 (Liberia profile –Timeline, 2016). 
During these years, rebel groups and warlords created massive instability within the country. 
People were ruthlessly killed, women raped, and children forced into becoming soldiers (Liberia 
country profile, 2016). In 2003, the civil war came to an end with the help of Nigerian 
peacekeepers, U.S. troops, UN peacekeeping missions, and a peace treaty between the 
government and the rebels (Liberia profile –Timeline, 2016). Since then, the country has 
struggled to rebuild itself, and re-establish stability. The civil war that plagued Liberia created 
distrust between the people and the Liberian government. Currently, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf serves 
as president of the nation. She is not only the first woman president, but has also made efforts to 
“secure peace, promote economic and social development, and strengthen the position of 
women” (Liberia country profile, 2016). When the Ebola crisis hit Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea in 2014, Liberia was hardest hit by the disease. It is important to understand the 
background of this West African nation so that the Ebola crisis and results of the study can be 
fully put into context. The next section will look at the beginning of the Ebola virus disease, and 
it’s spread and prevention. 
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History of Ebola 
“Ebola virus is invisible, except through an electron microscope or by way of its 
pathogenic effects. It is impersonal. It is apolitical. It seems to kill like the tenth plague of Egypt 
in Exodus-the one inflicted by an angel of death” (Quammen, 2015, pg. 1). In the summer of 
2014, the world woke to a deadly epidemic that was hitting Africa and rapidly spreading across 
the borders of various nations. EVD, also known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever, originated in 1976 
in Nzara, Sudan and Yambuku, Democratic Republic of Congo. It is classified by scientists as a 
zoonosis, “an animal infection that’s transmissible to humans” (Quammen, 3).  
David Quammen, in his book Ebola: The Natural and Human History of a Deadly Virus,  
explains zoonosis.  
The disease might be caused by a virus, or a bacterium, or a protozoan, or some other 
form of dangerous bug. That bug might live inconspicuously in a kind of rodent, or a bat, 
or a bird, or a monkey, or an ape. Crossing by some accident from its animal hideaway 
into its first human victim, it might find hospitable conditions; it might replicate 
aggressively and abundantly; it might cause illness, even death; and in the meantime, it 
might pass onward from its first human victim into others. (p. 2) 
The bubonic plague, swine flu, bird flu, SARS, and West Nile fever are comparable to Ebola and 
can also be classified as zoonosis (Quammen, 3). EVD is passed to humans through the blood, 
organs, secretions, and bodily functions of infected animals. It has been transmitted through 
chimpanzees, gorillas, fruit bats, monkeys, forest antelope, and even porcupines (Ebola virus 
disease, 2015).  
Doctors, scientists, biologists, and health organizations have struggled to understand the 
disease. Because of its ghost-like nature, it has been difficult to identify and diagnose the virus 
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since the first outbreak in 1976. Part of the battle with EVD is understanding how it functions 
and transmits from person to person. According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, there is no identified host for it. “Because the natural reservoir host of Ebola viruses 
has not yet been identified, the way in which the virus first appears in a human at the start of an 
outbreak is unknown. However, scientists believe that the first patient becomes infected through 
contact with an infected animal, such as a fruit bat or primate (apes and monkeys), which is 
called a spillover event” (Transmission, 2015).  
Disease Function 
Once a human is infected by the virus, a transmission occurs under different conditions. 
EVD spreads through direct contact in three main ways; the first, through blood or body fluids, 
such as urine, saliva, sweat, feces, vomit, breast milk, or semen. “Direct contact means that body 
fluids from an infected person (dead or alive) have touched someone’s eyes, nose, or mouth or an 
open cut, wound, or abrasion” (Q&As on Transmission, 2015). The second method of 
transmission is through contaminated medical supplies; such as needles or syringes that were 
used on a contagious person. The third method is transmission through infected fruit bats or 
certain types of monkeys or apes (Transmission, 2015). While not mentioned in the 
aforementioned methods, questions often arise about whether or not EVD can be transmitted 
through coughing or sneezing. Currently, there is no evidence that it can be transmitted to 
humans in this way, however because it can be transmitted through the body fluids of an infected 
person, sneezing could possibly deliver it to someone else. According to the CDC, “large 
droplets (splashes or sprays) or respiratory or other secretions from a person who is sick with 
Ebola could be infectious” (How Ebola is Spread, 2015). These droplets could also provide 
short-term contamination on hard surfaces, such as bathrooms, handrails, doors, and other areas. 
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“Droplet spread happens when fluids in large droplets from a sick person splash the eyes, nose, 
or mouth of another person or through a cut in the skin” (How Ebola is Spread, 2015). This is 
why medical personnel treating Ebola must wear protective equipment. At the beginning of the 
outbreak, many people thought EVD was airborne and could not be caught through water or 
food. However, in Africa some people were given the disease through the handling of bush meat 
(touching or eating a dead animal that was carrying the virus). 
Interestingly enough, and much more dangerous, is the timeline of when one is 
contagious. Once a person has the virus, they are not actually contagious until they begin to show 
symptoms. Symptoms of Ebola manifest in many different ways, but the most common are the 
following: fever, severe headache, muscle pain, weakness, fatigue, and sore throat (Signs and 
Symptoms, 2015). The World Health Organization (WHO) lists that after these primary 
symptoms, vomiting, diarrhea, rash, impaired kidney and liver function, and internal and external 
bleeding (oozing gums, blood in stool etc.) follow (Ebola virus disease, 2015). These symptoms 
can show up anywhere from 2 to 21 days after exposure to EVD, but most begin to show within 
8 to 10 days of exposure (Signs and Symptoms, 2015). Diagnosis can sometimes be difficult 
because the symptoms appear to be very concurrent with other infectious diseases like malaria, 
typhoid fever, and meningitis (Ebola virus disease, 2015).  Those that are unsure of whether or 
not they have it, can be tested for several different things.  The CDC records that within a few 
days after symptoms begin (it can take up to 3 days of symptoms for the virus to become 
detectable) the following tests can be run: antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
(ELISA) testing, IgMELISA, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and virus isolation (Diagnosis, 
2015). A few other diagnostic tests, such as IgM and IgG antibodies, immunihistochemistry 
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testing, PCR, and virus isolation can be given during the disease, in recovery, or after death 
(Diagnosis, 2015). 
Treatment 
The CDC gives a few basic interventions to increase the survival rate if implemented 
early on in diagnosis. Most EVD patients can be treated with “intravenous fluids (IV), balancing 
electrolytes (body salts), maintaining oxygen status and blood pressure, and treat other infections 
if they occur” (Treatment, 2015). There are a few experimental vaccines and treatments that are 
being developed, but none have been officially approved as of yet by the FDA. One of those 
experimental vaccines has proven to be effective and is currently in Phase III trials. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) has approved this vaccine to be used in the three countries where 
Ebola hit the hardest (Huster, 2016). There is hope that this particular vaccine could be the cure, 
if not at least an agent of change to slow down the rapid spread of the disease. Whether or not 
someone survives the deadly virus is based on how early it is caught, good medical care, and 
immune system response to treatment (Treatment, 2015). Some patients experience lasting side 
effects, such as vision and multiple joint complications. Those who survive the disease have 
antibodies that are said to last up to at least ten years; however, it is unknown if these survivors 
are immune to other strands of Ebola (Treatment, 2015).  
Prevention of EVD is fairly simple, though in underdeveloped countries with fragile 
infrastructure, lack of basic hygiene complicates the process. For the average person to avoid the 
virus, they should practice careful hygiene, such as washing their hands with soap or using hand 
sanitizer that is alcohol based. People should avoid contact with blood and body fluids, as well as 
any items that might have come in contact with these things, such as clothing, bedding, or 
medical supplies (Prevention, 2015). Lastly, it is imperative to not touch the bodies of those that 
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have passed away from EVD, including abstaining from any burial rituals. A dead human body 
is actually the most contagious because the virus has completely taken over by the point of death. 
If someone passes away within the home, appropriate burial teams place the body in a bag, 
disinfect the home with chlorine solution, and swab for a sample to be tested. Everything 
touched by the infected person must be removed and burned. The family is then notified if the 
Ebola test was positive or negative. If positive, the family must remain at home for 21 days (the 
amount of time it takes for the virus to appear if another member was infected) (Allow for a Safe 
Burial When Someone Dies at Home, 2015). 
Healthcare and medical professionals also take basic steps to prevent themselves from 
contracting EVD while treating the sick. Professionals wear personal protective equipment 
(PPE), practice proper infection control and sterilization measures, and isolate Ebola patients 
from other patients (Prevention, 2015). WHO reports much of the same qualifications, such as 
the following: “These include basic hand hygiene, respiratory hygiene, use of personal protective 
equipment (to block splashes or other contact with infected materials), safe injection practices 
and safe burial practices” (Ebola virus disease, 2015). In addition to this, workers should provide 
extra measures to ensure that there is no direct contact with the patient’s blood or body fluids. 
For most workers this means wearing a face shield or pair of goggles, clean, non-sterile long-
sleeved gown, gloves, and heavy-duty boots (Ebola virus disease, 2015). If monitored closely 
and vigilantly, these measures should prevent most healthcare professionals from contracting 
EVD. 
The most recent outbreak of Ebola occurred in 2014 throughout Africa, mainly in Sierra 
Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. This specific outbreak can be traced back to patient zero, meaning 
the first person to have contracted the disease during this time. The New York Times reported in 
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“How Ebola Roared Back” that patient zero was Emille Ouamouno, who was one-year-old 
(Sack, Fink, Belluck, & Nossiter, 2014). Emille was from a small village in Mellandou, Guinea 
and died in December of 2013. It was the deadliest of the several outbreaks that the world has 
seen since the disease first appeared in 1976. According to Huster (2016), the current epidemic, 
as of March 2016, has reported over 28,600 cases and 11,300 deaths in the course of the last two 
years. Now that a thorough understanding has been provided of how EVD functions, a rationale 
will explain why this particular topic is being studied. 
Rationale 
 The Ebola crisis was chosen by the researcher because of the significance it played in an 
internship experience. During the summer of 2014, the researcher interned domestically with 
Samaritan’s Purse and heard about EVD before Dr. Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol became ill. 
Many of the interns working at Samaritan’s Purse got a taste of what it was like when a health 
crisis affected not just one part, but all parts of an organization. The workers fighting overseas 
were not just people, they were fellow coworkers, colleagues, and supervisors. As the non-profit 
fought in prayer and action for their own, and the Liberian people, the heart of the researcher was 
broken for the developing situation. The experience of the researcher that summer inspired the 
study of Ebola and how it relates to situational crisis communication theory. 
Research Questions 
The world is no stranger to epidemics and crises, such as unfortunate and mysterious 
ghost diseases that steal life from thousands. The researcher could not think of a topic more 
deserving of study than how effective communication functions during crisis, allowing those in 
crisis to respond appropriately and effectively to save lives. The purpose of this research is to 
rhetorically analyze the impact of the communicative response of Samaritan’s Purse to the Ebola 
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crisis through the lens of W. Timothy Coomb’s situational crisis communication theory. The 
researcher will use the following questions to guide this study: 
(RQ1) How did the healthcare systems (Ministry of Health and hospitals) communicate about 
Ebola? 
(RQ2) How did the non-profit Samaritan’s Purse respond to this crisis? 
(RQ3) In what ways could Coomb’s theory guide effective communication in a crisis situation?  
A brief history of Samaritan’s Purse and the Liberian conflict has been provided for the 
reader. In addition, a thorough knowledge base of the Ebola virus disease, its spread and 
prevention control were outlined. The researcher explained the rationale behind the study and 
presented the questions that will be used to guide the research. 
Chapter two will discuss the literature related to this study with attention on Coomb’s 
situational crisis communication theory. Chapter three will discuss methodology and what 
specific tactics the study uses to gather and obtain critical information. Chapter four will present 
the results of the study and chapter five will discuss the results and provide further research and 
general conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Crises can strike at any time or place. Thus, it has become increasingly important to 
understand how to effectively handle a crisis when it occurs. “Crises are…important social, 
political, economic and environmental forces and arguably create more change more quickly 
than any other single phenomenon. Crises have the potential to do great harm, creating 
widespread and systematic disruption” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p.1). Managers and 
organizations must learn how to deal with them efficiently. Crises continue to occur around the 
globe, a few examples occurring in the last two years are: the Syrian refugee crisis with millions 
of people being displaced from their homes, the earthquake that rocked Nepal, damaging the 
country, and the civil war that has been escalating in South Sudan. These few examples 
reemphasize that crisis can “create widespread and systemic disruption” (Sellnow & Seeger, 
2013, p. 1). Organizations must understand and learn how to appropriately respond to a crisis 
pre-disaster, during the disaster, and post-disaster. Crises will always be a threat, and depending 
on how they are handled can become an opportunity for growth. This literature review explores 
situational crisis communication theory, related theories and examples of situations where SCCT 
has been applied. 
Crisis as Defined by Coombs 
To better understand situational crisis communication theory, it is important to 
understand what is meant by the term crisis. As defined by Coombs (2007), in his original work 
detailing SCCT, crisis is “a sudden and unexpected event that threatens to disrupt an 
organization’s operations and poses both a financial and reputational threat. Crises can harm 
stakeholders physically, emotionally and/or financially” (p. 2). Crises not only damage the 
reputation of the organization, but can harm employees, the community, stockholders, customers, 
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or suppliers (Coombs, 2007). This definition lays a basic foundation for understanding the theory 
as a whole. 
“Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) provides an evidence-based 
framework for understanding how to maximize the reputational protection afforded by post-crisis 
communication” (Coombs, 2007, p. 163). SCCT, created by W. Timothy Coombs, was a result 
of previous research and was officially established in 2007.  Refined through the years, it was 
originally introduced in 1995 as a symbolic approach and then tested in 2002 (Kyhn, 2008).   
“SCCT consists of three core elements: (1) the crisis situation, (2) crisis response strategies, and 
(3) a system for matching the crisis situation and crisis response strategies” (Kyhn, 2008, p.4). 
The theory provides overall guidelines for managers in crisis situations and then more specific 
instruction based on what level of involvement the organization had in the crisis. The initial 2002 
study says “SCCT is premised on matching the crisis response to the level of crisis responsibility 
attributed to a crisis” (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, p. 166).  SCCT was born out of a need for 
crisis management guidelines, as Coombs researched countless case studies documenting 
organizational responses to crises, he realized that there were no guidelines for the stages of a 
crisis – before, during, and after (2007).  “Crisis management needs evidence-based crisis 
communication guidance. Evidence-based guidance for decision making in a crisis must be 
supported by scientific evidence from empirical research rather than personal preference and 
unscientific experience” (Coombs, 2007, p. 163).  SCCT provides a way for crisis managers and 
other individuals to be able to react to a crisis situation grounded on research rather than 
speculation or “best practices” guidelines. The core of situational crisis communication theory is 
based in and inspired by attribution theory. 
Attribution Theory 
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 Coombs drew on attribution theory, a popular social-psychological theory, to help 
develop situational crisis communication theory. Attribution theory states that once an event 
occurs, people will try to establish and figure out why the event happened. Even if the people 
themselves have little to no knowledge of the event, they will still assign responsibility to 
someone (because someone must be responsible) (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Most people will 
experience either anger or sympathy when a crisis occurs and both of these emotions can cause 
people to have a motivation to act (Coombs, 2007).  “Behavioral responses (as cited in Weiner, 
2006) are negative when a person is judged responsible and anger is evoked. Behavioral 
responses are positive when a person is judged responsible and sympathy is evoked.”  Based on 
their emotions, stakeholders assign responsibility to someone. “The general attribution is that 
responsibility lies with the person involved in the event (internal) or environmental factors 
(external). For instance, a car skids off the road and hits a tree. The cause might be driver 
(internal) or ice on the road (external)” (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). The two theories are easily 
connected because of attributions the audience assigns to the organization. Is the organization at 
fault or were there other factors involved when the crisis occurred? “One of the main proponents 
(as cited in Weiner, 1986) of attribution theory (AT), attributions of internal or external 
responsibility shape affective and behavioral responses to the person involved in the event”. 
Attribution theory is audience based because of how it seeks to understand the factors that 
influence what the audience will attribute to the organization after the crisis.  “SCCT is rooted 
(cited in Hazleton, 2006) in AT and efforts to translate its ideas into crisis communication.” The 
connection between AT and SCCT is clear. 
Basic Understanding of SCCT 
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In The Handbook of Crisis Communication, Coombs talks about the early development of 
situational crisis communication theory. “The premise was very (as cited in Coombs 1995; 
Coombs & Holladay 1996; Schwarz 2008) simple: crises are negative events, stakeholders will 
make attributions about crisis responsibility, and those attributions will affect how stakeholders 
interact with the organization in crisis.” The theory focuses on stakeholders and how they (or the 
audience) react to the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). “SCCT is audience oriented because it 
seeks to illuminate how people perceive crises, their reactions to crisis response strategies, and 
audience reactions to the organization in crisis” (Coombs & Holladay, 2010, p. 38). It is 
important to understand the effect of the attributions people assert concerning the crisis, because 
this in turn affects their attitudes and behavior (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). SCCT looks at a 
general crisis and categorizes it as victim, accidental, or intentional. Once it has been categorized 
the organization is responsible for preventing further harm and helping people cope 
psychologically (help them see what prevention will be taken so it does not occur again). After 
these two steps have been taken, an organization discovers how to react based on their 
responsibility to what has happened (Aarhus School of Business, 2009).  
Responsibility and Reputation 
Crisis responsibility and reputation are core to the theory of situational crisis 
communication theory. An organization’s reputation is a priceless entity and is one, that, if 
damaged, may or may not be able to be repaired again. In addition to reputation, there is also 
reputational capital. “Reputational capital is an organization’s stock of perceptual and social 
assets—the quality of the relationship it has established with stakeholders and the regard in 
which the company and brand is held” (as cited in Fombrun and van Riel, 2004, p. 32).   The 
way that people perceive an organization can greatly influence the outcomes of certain situations. 
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“Attributions of crisis responsibility have a significant effect on how people perceive the 
reputation of an organization in crisis and their affective and behavioral responses to that 
organization following a crisis” (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). The more responsibility attributed 
to the organization by the audience, the more threat through the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 
2010).  To be able to effectively deal with crisis threat, SCCT offers two steps to analyze the 
danger. The first step categorizes how responsible/not responsible the organization is for the 
crisis (viewed through the stakeholder’s decision).  The crisis is framed - the lens through which 
the organization sees the crisis and communicates it as so -  through different crisis types to 
determine the organization’s level of responsibility. These frames contain certain “cues”. “The 
cues include whether or not some external agent or force caused the crisis, whether the cause of 
the crisis was technical or human error. It does matter if stakeholders view the event as an 
accident, sabotage or criminal negligence” (Coombs, 2007, p. 6). 
Identifying Crisis Type 
“SCCT works from a grouping of three crisis types: victim (low crisis 
responsibility/threat), accident (minimal crisis responsibility/threat), and intentional (strong crisis 
responsibility/threat)” (Coombs & Holladay, 2010).  Coombs and Holladay (2002) go into more 
detail about these crisis types.  (1) the victim cluster has very weak attributions of crisis 
responsibility (natural disasters, workplace violence, product tampering and rumor) and the 
organization is viewed as a victim of the event; (2) the accidental cluster has minimal attributions 
of crisis responsibility (technical-error accident, technical-error product harm and challenge) and 
the event is considered unintentional or uncontrollable by the organization and (3) the intentional 
cluster has very strong attributions of crisis responsibility (human-error accident, human-error 
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product harm and organizational misdeed) and the event is considered purposeful (p.4). These 
crisis types can help managers understand the organization’s level of responsibility. 
 Crisis History and Prior Reputation 
Once the level of crisis threat has been identified, the second step is to determine what 
the crisis history is and what the prior reputation of the organization has been.  If an organization 
has had a few crises in the past, the threat to the organization increases dramatically. Coombs 
(2007) developed the Crisis History Proposition, which “states that an organization that 
experienced a similar crisis in the past is attributed greater crisis responsibility and suffers more 
direct and indirect reputational damage than an organization with no history of crises “(p.5).  
This also plays into prior reputation, because most stakeholders will have less trust for an 
organization that has had mishaps before. According to Coombs and Holladay (2010), prior 
reputation is defined as “how well or poorly an organization has treated stakeholders in the past-
the general state of its relationship with stakeholders”. Coombs (2007) also developed the Prior 
Relationship Reputation Proposition, which states, “an organization that treated stakeholders 
badly in the past is attributed greater crisis responsibility and suffers more direct and indirect 
reputational damage than an organization with a neutral or positive relationship reputation” (p.5).  
How does the audience perceive the organization as a whole? Have there been previous 
misdemeanors and or crises?  “Organizations (as cited in Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2007) with 
negative prior reputations are attributed greater crisis responsibility for the same crisis than an 
organization that is unknown or has a positive prior reputation”. If crisis history or prior 
reputation is present, then the attributions that the audience (or stakeholders) place on an 
organization will greatly affect the situation. This may also mean that the crisis type would be 
categorized more highly than if the organization had previously had no crisis situations. Before a 
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manager chooses the best strategy on how to respond to the crisis though, they must deliver 
instructing or adjusting information. 
Instructing and Adjusting  
When a crisis occurs in real life, a manager must immediately provide a base response in 
regards to the crisis, especially if it is serious enough to be affecting the lives of stakeholders. 
Therefore, they will deliver what is known as instructing or adjusting information. Instructing 
information shows the stakeholders what action to take in order to protect their reputation, such 
as pulling a recall product out or clearing a dangerous area (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). This 
type of information is helping to prevent further harm. Craig Carroll (2013, describes it as 
helping “stakeholders to cope physically with the crisis; it tells stakeholders how to protect 
themselves from the crisis threat” (p. 265). Examples of this would be instructing stakeholders 
on how to evacuate an area, how to get to a shelter, or how to go about returning a hazardous 
recalled item. Adjusting information allows the stakeholders to cope with whatever has occurred 
psychologically. “Expression of concern (Coombs 2007b; Sturges 1994) or sympathy, basic 
information on the crisis event, and any corrective actions to prevent a repeat of the crisis would 
qualify as adjusting information”. It is important that these two types of messages be the first 
type of communication to go out once a crisis has occurred. This information should “reflect the 
need to make public safety the number one priority during a crisis” (Carroll, 2013, p. 267).  Once 
the organization has instructed and adjusted their information, they can officially begin to correct 
the damage. 
Crisis Response Strategies 
SCCT provides three main crisis response strategies that can be used once a crisis has 
occurred. “Crisis response strategies are used to repair the reputation, to reduce negative affect 
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and to prevent negative behavioral intentions” (Coombs, 2007, p.5). The crisis response 
strategies that will be described in the coming paragraphs have three main objectives when it 
comes to protecting reputation. According to Coombs (as cited in 1995 work), these strategies 
“shape attributions of the crisis, change perceptions of the organization in crisis, and reduce the 
negative affect generated by the crisis”.  These response strategies are based off of the 
responsibility of the organization towards the crisis.  “As crisis response strategies become more 
accommodative, show greater concern for victims, stakeholders perceive the organization as 
taking responsibility for the crisis” (Coombs and Holladay, 2004, 2005). The three strategies are 
that of denying, diminishing, or rebuilding, in addition to a fourth reinforcing, which is a side 
strategy. These three strategies can also be expanded into eight crisis response strategies 
provided by Coombs in his 1999 work, Ongoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing, 
and Responding (found in chart below).  
Attack on Accuser Crisis manager confronts person/group that claims a crisis exists 
Denial  Crisis manager claims that there is no crisis 
Excuse Crisis manager attempts to minimize organizational responsibility 
Victimization Crisis manager reminds stakeholders that organization is a victim of 
crisis as well. 
Justification Crisis manager attempts to minimize the perceived damage inflicted 
by the crisis 
Ingratiation Crisis manager praises stakeholders & reminds them of the past good 
works done by the organization 
Corrective action Crisis manager tries to prevent a repeat of the crisis and/or repair the 
damage done by the crisis 
Full apology Crisis manager publicly accepts responsibility for the crisis & requests 
forgiveness from the stakeholders 
(Coombs, 2007, p.3) 
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These eight strategies give managers more specific guidelines within the three strategies on how 
to handle crisis situations.  
Denial Strategy 
The crisis communication research goes into depth on the three strategies that sum up the 
eight strategies given in Coombs’ early work. The first main strategy is denial. Denying involves 
the organization explaining that the crisis was someone else’s fault or that it did not occur. If 
they are not connected to the situation, then they will not suffer any reputational harm. 
According to Coombs (2007), “in rumor and challenge crises, managers need to argue that there 
is no ‘real’ crisis. Managers deny the truth to the rumor or refuter the charges of immoral 
conduct” (p.7). The organization is attempting to claim no responsibility for the crisis, which will 
result in little to no damage (Coombs & Holladay, 2010).  
Diminish Strategy 
The second option is the diminish strategy. According to Coombs & Holladay (2010), 
“diminish strategies seek to minimize the organization’s crisis responsibility and/or reduce the 
perceived seriousness of the crisis”. While this can be used successfully, it is also an option that 
can be marked by failure because of outside sources. Those that use this will need solid and 
believable evidence to back up their claim (Coombs, 2007). “Failure occurs when the news 
media or, in the case of online-oriented crises, people posting messages reject the crisis 
manager’s frame and continue using a different frame” (Coombs, 2007, p. 7). This clearly shows 
how difficult it can be for a manager to choose the correct frame that will continue to evoke trust 
from stakeholders.  Reinforcing this statement, Coombs (2007), goes on to say, “stakeholders 
will be given competing frames and will select the frame provided by the source they find most 
credible” (p.7). This strategy works very well when an accidental crisis has occurred. 
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Rebuilding Strategy 
Lastly, the organization can also choose to employ rebuilding strategies. If the 
organization is completely at fault, they would use this strategy, which would involve 
apologizing and providing compensation to parties to bolster the perceptions the audience had of 
the situation (Coombs & Holladay, 2010).  This type of strategy helps to generate a better 
reputation.  “Rebuild strategies attempt to improve the organization’s reputation by offering 
material and/or symbolic forms of aid to victims” (Coombs, 2007, p.7). This helps to, hopefully, 
offset the damage that has been done through the crisis. The rebuilding strategy is mostly used 
when the reputational threat is very high. “The rebuild strategies are used for crises that present a 
severe reputational threat such as intentional crises or accidental crises coupled with a crisis 
history and/or unfavorable prior relationship reputation” (Coombs, 2007, p.7).  It’s all about 
repairing the image as much as they can. 
Reinforcing 
 Lastly, there is also a type of side strategy that can be used, called reinforcing. In 
Coombs original work, it was known as bolstering.  “Reinforcing strategies try to add positive 
information about the organization by praising others (ingratiation) and/or reminding people of 
past good works by the organization (bolstering)” (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). In the original 
article on SCCT, Coombs (2007) talks about praising stakeholders. “Praising stakeholders 
generates some goodwill and being cast as the victim evokes sympathy for the organization” 
(p.7). This stage is utilized the most when it is paired with denying, diminishing, or rebuilding. 
“Reinforcing strategies (as cited in Coombs 2006) would seem odd if used alone and are 
opportunity strategies”. Reinforcing is viewed this way because it can only occur if the 
organization has a good past history. These good works from the past allow the organization to 
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draw from previous examples as they try to reinforce or bolster their reputation that has been 
damaged. 
Image Restoration Strategy 
 Within crisis strategy, there is an important connection between image restoration theory 
and SCCT. Coombs has talked about the power of these strategies and how a situation can be 
restored through different avenues of communication. The stakeholder’s perceptions and former 
attributions can be completely changed from what they once were. “SCCT shares this (as cited in 
Benoit, 1995) belief in the power of communication with image restoration theory.  Both believe 
in the power of man’s ability to communicate.” Image Restoration Theory is a descriptive system 
used to analyze crisis cases. The focal point is identifying which crisis response strategies were 
used in the case and drawing speculative conclusions about the utility of the crisis response 
strategies” (Coombs, 2007, p.6). SCCT takes the crisis response strategies provided by image 
restoration theory and uses them to create a system for how stakeholders and managers alike will 
react to crisis when it comes (Coombs, 2007).  
Boundaries in Selecting Crisis Strategies 
 Every crisis must be responded to, but many managers in crisis communication will face 
boundaries when it comes to selecting a strategy on how to respond. They are bound by financial 
restrictions in some cases. One strategy might work better, but would be too expensive. “The 
more (as cited in Cohen, 1999; Patel and Reinsch, 2003; Stockmyer, 1996) accommodative the 
strategy, the more expensive it is for the organization. For example, a manager might have to go 
with the excuse apology because they could not afford the after-effects of the apology strategy 
(Coombs, 2007, p.8).  However, the decision to use a certain strategy can be affected by the 
frame that the media has already chosen to use. Most of the stakeholders and/or audience will 
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hear about the crisis through the media (Coombs, 2007, p.8). This puts the organization at an 
obvious disadvantage. “Research from (as cited in Carroll, 2004) agenda setting and reputation 
suggest that the stakeholders will adopt the media’s frame for crisis”. If a frame for the crisis is 
already established, the manager will need to adjust the frame of choice in order to respond and 
repair damage people or media have caused (Coombs, 2007, p.9). It is up to the manager then to 
determine which strategy will best fit the crisis situation and repair the reputation. Coombs 
(2007) reiterates the purpose of the theory: “SCCT models the crisis situation and provides an 
evidence-based set of guidelines for using crisis response strategies that can benefit crisis 
managers and their organizations” (p.9). It is important for managers to select the most 
appropriate crisis strategy to be able to uphold the reputation of the organization. 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory Studies & Examples 
 The following case studies are examples of different organizations that have encountered 
crisis and responded clearly or have effectively applied SCCT theory to the situation. 
The Red Cross 
 In the article Through the looking glass: A decade of Red Cross crisis response and 
situational crisis communication theory, Sisco, Collins, and Zoch analyze how the Red Cross 
responded to crisis through the lens of SCCT.  Over the last twenty years, the Red Cross 
experienced numerous crisis situations that damaged their reputation.  In 1998, they were 
accused of not screening their blood tightly enough, which led to thousands of people contracting 
serious diseases.  “The scope of the problem (as cited in Parker, 1998), and its implications, 
paralyzed the Red Cross, to whom the federal [government] had delegated [its] responsibility for 
protecting the blood supply”. This incident caused the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to 
completely restructure and reorganize how the nation dealt with the blood supply. Next, in the 
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1990s, Joseph Lecowitch, the Executive Director for the New Jersey chapter and his bookkeeper 
Catalina Escoto, were caught embezzling millions of dollars. This, of course, brought scrutiny 
from many stakeholders that questioned how much access local chapters had to the 
organization’s finances as a whole. Then in 2011, there was a mishap with money collected for 
families affected after a terrorist attack. “After the attacks (as cited in Allen, 2005) on September 
11, 2001, the Red Cross was involved in what was arguably one of the largest nonprofit scandals 
in history after it withheld more than half of the $543 million collected to help survivors and the 
families of those killed”. Lastly, in 2005, the Red Cross was widely criticized after Hurricane 
Katrina. Their response to the national disaster was incredibly slow, in addition to there being 
question of the appropriateness of how they distributed financial aid to those in need. “With two 
national crises (as cited in Katrina: The long road back, 2005) so close together, the Red Cross 
was again criticized for the lack of control over local chapters, inability to provide volunteers, 
and distribution of donations”. 
 The study analyzed 1,585 news articles, using five major American newspapers accessed 
through a scholarly database. The Houston Chronicle, The New York Times, The Washington 
Post, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the San Francisco Chronicle were all coded and studied to 
see if they were written in times of crisis and to see what, if any, the crisis response was.  The 
newspapers collected the following amount of articles that dealt just with criticism in regards to 
the Red Cross’ performance: The Houston Chronicle-63 articles The New York Times-43 articles, 
The Washington Post-49 articles, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch-38 articles, and the San Francisco 
Chronicle-10 articles (Sisco, Collins, Zoch, 2010).  Eighty-three percent of the articles included 
a response from a national Red Cross spokesperson, fifteen percent included a response from a 
local representative, and three percent included a response from a volunteer (Sisco, Collins, 
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Zoch, 2010). In the end, all three strategies as listed by SCCT theory were employed. Fifty-four 
percent of the articles showed the diminish strategy being used, twenty-five percent of the 
articles found the rebuild strategy being used, and eighteen percent of the articles used the deny 
strategy. Across the board, in the articles that were categorized under victim, accident, and 
preventable crisis, the diminish strategy was used the most. Finally, the study found that the 
articles that mentioned previous negative crises were negative seventy-one percent of the time 
(Sisco, Collins, Zoch, 2010)! This study concluded that the Red Cross chose the response 
strategy one-third of the time and could have repaired their reputation more if they had used the 
theory of SCCT. 
General Motors Bankruptcy 
 In, An examination of the situational crisis communication theory through the general 
motors bankruptcy, Skye Cooley and Asya Cooley conducted a study using SCCT. The study 
looked at General Motors filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy and then evaluated the response to 
their financial crisis. The crisis began in 2008 for General Motors. The company began 
discussing a merger with Chrysler, closing down plants and cutting thousands of jobs. Later the 
same year, they receive $13.4 billion from the U.S. troubled asset relief program. Then in 2009, 
they requested another 22 billion dollars from the government to aid them in their time of need 
(Cooley & Cooley, 2011). The CEO, Rick Wagoner, then resigned a few months later and one 
month after that GM received $2 billion in governmental aid! In the same month, they cut 21,000 
more jobs in an effort to avoid bankruptcy. However, this too did not seem to help because yet 
another month later they received $4 billion from the government (making the total amount 
received, $19.4 billion). “On May 31, 2009 (as cited in ‘Timeline’) investors holding about 54 
percent of GM’s $27.2 billions of bonds indicated support for a U.S. Treasury-brokered swap 
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that may help speed the way through bankruptcy”. Finally, General Motors filed for bankruptcy 
on June 1, 2009. Surprisingly, the U.S. government offered to pay $30 billion of funds (taxpayer 
dollars) to help the company reorganize itself. As a result, GM sold its Hummer and Saturn lines, 
in addition to discontinuing several models of trucks. On June 25, 2009, GM officially received 
$33.3 billion dollars from the government (including Canada and Ontario governments). After 
that, key operations and core brands were sold to a new company created under the United States 
Treasury (Cooley & Cooley, 2011). The crisis that General Motors went through was extreme, 
especially in regards to financial aid.  
 Using a content analysis, Cooley’s study looked at all publically released statements to 
the public about the bankruptcy of GM and the creating of the new GM under the government 
organization.  They looked at press releases, conferences, CEO blogs and speeches, GM’s 
YouTube page, and a speech from the president. The study analyzed at a total of 133 crisis 
communication responses between the dates of June 1, 2009 to July 10, 2009 (Cooley & Cooley, 
2011). Forty-eight percent of the communication used the deny strategy, forty-six percent used 
the deal strategy, and six percent used the diminish strategy. The diminish cluster was used the 
most out of the three given, followed by deal and deny. 
 General Motors faced a great challenge in communication. “The SCCT model predicts 
that companies facing crises such as bankruptcy have an increased risk of reputational damage 
due to the fact that blame for the crisis is more attributable to the company itself’ (Cooley & 
Cooley, 2011, p. 2008).  Not only did the company cut millions of jobs, but they also borrowed 
billions of dollars from the government and closed a few major dealerships (Cooley & Cooley, 
2011).  However, throughout all of this, GM generally followed the theory of SCCT.  “While not 
ideal to circumstances for a company to find itself, GM’s crisis communication response to the 
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challenges it faced largely followed the recommendations of the SCCT model and provide 
insight into which particular crisis communication strategies and message clusters companies use 
when filing Chapter 11” (Cooley & Cooley, 2011, p. 209). GM did three things that allowed 
them to use proper crisis communication. First, they used the diminish strategy to point people 
towards the economic downturn and to make it okay that they had received billions of funding 
from the government. Secondly, they used the deal strategy to empathize with the stakeholders 
and employees that were suffering. Lastly, they owned up to their failures (did not apologize 
profusely over it), kept a positive outlook by changing their culture and pointed towards a 
brighter future (Cooley & Cooley, 2011). This particular study showed the “specific strategies 
and strategy clusters from the SCCT model as applied to crisis management” (Cooley & Cooley, 
2011, p.210). 
The above studies were a few great examples of the way that situational crisis 
communication theory has been used in crisis situations. It is important to demonstrate the 
practical applicability of SCCT. In the eight years since its conception, SCCT continues to 
become more and more refined. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
 
 This study identifies the crisis communication strategies used by the non-profit 
Samaritan’s Purse during the Ebola outbreak. It will look at what those working firsthand in the 
field experienced in regards to how communication was disseminated to the public as the 
outbreak occurred. The methodology chapter is designed to present the research questions, 
research design, the methods used to collect data and the analytical procedure. The following 
questions to guide this study: 
(RQ1) How did the healthcare systems (Ministry of Health and hospitals) communicate 
about Ebola? 
(RQ2) How did the non-profit Samaritan’s Purse respond to this crisis? 
(RQ3) In what ways could Coomb’s theory guide effective communication in a crisis 
situation? 
Mixed-Methods Research 
 The researcher applied a mixed methods approach for this study because of what it offers 
in the terms of textured information. Founded in 2000, mixed method research combines both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Gail Caruth, in a study on mixed method research, 
compared it to qualitative and content research. “It offers richer insights into the phenomenon 
being studied and allows the capture of information that might be missed by utilizing only one 
research design (Caruth, 2013, p.1). Information gleaned from mixed methods research is in-
depth and can develop more questions for research done in the future. John Creswell notes that 
this type of design specifically describes the experiences of participants. “This description 
culminates in the essence of the experiences for several individuals who have all experienced the 
same phenomenon” (Creswell, 2014, p. 14). The approach is the most suited for this study 
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because the crisis being analyzed took place in another country and is inaccessible to the 
researcher. It will allow for data to be collected second-hand in an accurate and precise manner. 
A mixed method study was chosen because it opened up doors for the researcher to gather 
accurate information through personal contacts, in addition to broadening the amount of 
knowledge available for collection. It will be used through conducting qualitative interviews and 
collecting public documents for use. 
Data Collection 
 For the purpose of this study, the researcher will collect data through two main outlets, 
interviews and published articles. All personal interviewees will have served during the Ebola 
crisis with the non-profit Samaritan’s Purse. These individuals may have served as nurses, 
doctors, general field staff, or distributors of health information. Two to three professionals will 
be interviewed and asked specific questions regarding what information was communicated and 
how it was disseminated. Interviews will occur primarily via Skype or by phone, although email 
will be utilized if necessary. In addition, the researcher hopes to gain access to some of the 
communication materials distributed by Samaritan’s Purse. 
Articles 
 The second main way that data will be collected is through information released and 
published from the non-profit during the crisis and as they helped to battle the disease. Fourteen 
published articles from the Samaritan’s Purse website were analyzed, from the time the outbreak 
began to the time the country was declared Ebola free in January of 2016. Each one was 
specifically chosen based on the relevance of the information provided regarding the study topic. 
Each of these articles was chosen because of the in-depth information provided about the Ebola 
crisis and communication. All information looked at is publicly accessible. The researcher will 
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analyze these publications, looking at the various ways the non-profit responded to the crisis and 
effectively communicated to the public about the Ebola virus. 
Data Analysis 
After the articles were collected, the following steps were taken to analyze them. All 
articles written by the non-profit, Samaritan’s Purse, were collected from the beginning to the 
end of the Ebola crisis. Each article was then compiled into a master list and sorted by date. 
Next, the researcher went through and read each article in sequential order, from beginning to 
end. It was considered important to read the selected pieces in order to get a full view of the 
entire crisis situation and what communication was used at each stage. Afterwards, articles were 
then sorted through based on their application to the study.  
The study will analyze how the theory of crisis communication was utilized or could have 
been utilized to lessen the ultimate death toll. Using Coomb’s theory, it will view the situation 
through it’s pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis stages. The goal is to seek to discover what 
happened from the very beginning of the outbreak in regards to communication. What was 
communicated to the public about the disease? When was action taken and how was information 
distributed? Secondly, the study will take this information and then seek to understand how the 
non-profit Samaritan’s Purse responded to what was going on and the communication they used 
during the time period. This theory was intentionally chosen for the study because of the 
desperate need for communication within the Ebola crisis. 
Expected Results 
The researcher is hoping to gain information from the interviews detailing the 
communication process from the beginning of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia to the end. 
According to Coombs, Samaritan’s Purse may be identified as a victim because they were not in 
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any way responsible for the outbreak of the disease. Beyond this, the researcher specifically 
believes the results will show denying and reinforcing methods used by the non-profit 
immediately following the discovery of the outbreak. The outbreak threatened the lives of 
millions of people, so although the responsibility for the crisis was low, the threat was incredibly 
high. The interviews will be used to get an in-depth look at the process of communication, so it is 
hoped that through this, the researcher will identify underlying themes within the response. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
 Research for this study was collected primarily in two ways. First, fourteen articles from 
the Samaritan’s Purse website were found, detailing their response to the Ebola outbreak from 
beginning to end. The researcher organized all articles into date order and read them 
chronologically in their entirety. Secondly, the researcher conducted interviews with two 
Samaritan’s Purse employees that worked in the midst of the Ebola crisis to get a more thorough 
understanding of how communication was utilized throughout. The following research questions 
led the study and research of the data being collected: 
(RQ1) How did the healthcare systems (Ministry of Health and hospitals) communicate 
about Ebola? 
(RQ2) How did the non-profit Samaritan’s Purse respond to this crisis? 
(RQ3) In what ways could Coomb’s theory guide effective communication in a crisis 
situation? 
The chapter is divided into two main sections, results from the interviews conducted and the 
analysis of the articles. 
Interviews 
Two Samaritan’s Purse employees who worked in Liberia during the Ebola crisis were 
interviewed. The interviews were forty minutes to one hour and took place over Skype. The 
below questions were asked of each participant regarding the communication process during 
Ebola.  
Q1: What is your position at Samaritan’s Purse and how long have you worked in this field? 
What did your job entail during the spread of Ebola? (ex: Did it change any? Did you take on 
any new tasks?). 
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Q2: When people began getting Ebola, what was their prior knowledge of the disease, if any? 
Q3: How much time passed before the information about Ebola began to be communicated to 
the public? 
Q4: What was communicated to the public about the disease? 
Q5: Specifically, what was the system and/or process that Samaritan’s Purse used to 
communicate to the public? 
Q6: How was this system created and what kinds of information did it cover with the public? 
How long did it take to create this? 
Q7: How was the information itself disseminated throughout the affected regions? 
Q8: What was the public’s reaction to this information? 
Q9: Did the healthcare systems within the country communicate about the disease? If so, please 
give a detailed response on how. 
Q10: In your opinion, what ways could communication have been better utilized to help lessen 
the death toll? 
It was found that both interviewees had an in-depth knowledge about the Ebola crisis 
because of their positions within the organization and time spent in the field. One interviewee’s 
work was based on the design and implementation of the Samaritan’s Purse Ebola response, 
while the other handled logistics (providing SITREPS to headquarters) and worked closely with 
healthcare (managing sanitation in the clinic with Ebola patients, traveling out to communities to 
remove the bodies of the deceased etc.). Although some people had heard about an Ebola 
breakout in Guinea, most did not have any prior knowledge of EVD before it hit the country. 
There was a reservoir for the disease, but there was no pass over of it until it hit in March of 
2014. The only thing comparable to Ebola that the people had some knowledge about was Lassa 
fever which is also a viral hemorrhagic fever. However, Lassa fever has a treatment and much 
A COMMUNICATIVE RESPONSE FROM SAMARITAN’S PURSE 41 
lower mortality rates. Participants were asked about the amount of time that passed before 
communication was disseminated to the public. There was already an outbreak of Ebola 
occurring in Guinea in 2014, but it did not officially cross over into Foya, Liberia until March 
22, 2014. Samaritan’s Purse immediately began developing Ebola messaging that was placed 
into each of the current programs that they were running. The team heard about the disease 
crossing over on a Saturday night and by Monday they had shifted programming, teaching the in-
country staff about the disease and developing communication plans. During the first few weeks 
of the outbreak, basic information was being shared with the area that Samaritan’s Purse worked 
in. This included what the disease was, symptoms, how it spread, prevention, the high mortality 
rate and what to do if they or a close family member felt sick. People were instructed to notify 
the district health officials if they noticed any travelers coming through from Guinea or a funeral.  
SP staff members began attending almost daily meetings with the Ministry of Health 
(MOH), which included the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and other 
key international non-governmental organizations (INGO’s). All materials and messaging had to 
first be approved by the MOH, who was focusing primarily on coordination of messaging. 
UNICEF was working with supporting water and sanitation hygiene support, while most of the 
other INGO’s helped support the printing of materials. In the early weeks, radio spots, printed 
materials like pamphlets, and even songs were created. The INGO’s were all major drivers of 
helping to get the information out. One of the earliest messages developed was “Ebola is real and 
it kills”. The organizations were so focused on getting the message out quickly that the quality of 
the message was not well developed (especially from a behavior change perspective). 
 During those first few weeks, messages were spread by SP staff members. Based off of 
their development model, SP in country staff live and “oversee” specific villages. It was easy, to 
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some extent, for the message to get out to these villages because SP is well-known and respected 
for the work they have done over the years in the country. Besides this, the team in Liberia had 
permission to develop a mass Ebola awareness campaign. Messaging was quickly put into 
already existing programs, such as literacy, church mobilization, water and sanitation hygiene, 
health programming and animal husbandry. Staff went door to door, walked the streets, spoke at 
community meetings, and mosques with the goal of blanketing the districts they were working in 
and spreading the message to anyone and everyone that would listen. This included handing out 
pamphlets (the first one contained only pictures) and walking through towns with megaphones. 
The first modes of messaging were vital because previously there was no EVD messaging 
developed. EVD lives in a reservoir or host, which makes it difficult to predict when an outbreak 
occurs, and up until this point, no one had ever seen it spread so violently. One of the 
participants pointed out that even during those first few weeks, SP recognized how serious the 
disease was. It sparked fear immediately, and no protocol on border crossings, combined with 
how quickly people move in the area, showed them the deadly potential. As the weeks wore on 
and the outbreak became more serious, different options for messaging appeared. The staff 
continued to talk with citizens face to face, but also used radio messaging, in addition to a few 
songs that were created. However, post EVD research done by SP has shown them however that 
the songs on the radio confused most people. As the outbreak continued to claim more and more 
lives, there was a shift in the communication messaging, from information only to 
empowerment. One interviewee spoke about this shift: 
At first we were all scared and we made the rookie mistake of thinking that information 
equals action. In reality, information may prompt someone to act, but has no bearing on 
what kind of action that person will take. So, the message “Ebola is real and it kills” was 
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true, and it did connect with some people and it influenced their behavior, but that was 
kind of a fluke. We saw the outbreak spiral out of control not because of a weak health 
care system but because of poor communication and a massive distrust of the government 
aid agencies. (Personal Communication, April 11, 2016) 
The messages being dispersed moved away from shock and towards aspirational messaging, with 
slogans like “Together we can stop Ebola” or “Let’s Kick Ebola out of Liberia”. 
  Unfortunately, despite all of the early messaging, the public’s reaction was poor to the 
information being communicated. Samaritan’s Purse has a long history in Liberia and is well 
known and respected, which is why they were able to spread the word in more communities. 
However, some of these communities refused to let them talk about Ebola. Rocks were thrown at 
vehicles and at people, which created a large security issue. It was found that most people did not 
even believe that Ebola was real, including those that held high positions in the government and 
healthcare workers (who were very open about the fact that “it was not real”). The results of 
research discovered that there was fear and distrust brewing among the citizens of Liberia for a 
few different reasons. Liberia was ravaged by a civil war from 1989-2003, which killed more 
than 250,000 people (Liberia country profile, 2016). This time of civil war left Liberians in a 
place of mistrusting the government and outsiders, specifically in the more indigenous areas of 
the country. This mistrust ran so deep that the Liberian people believed Ebola to be a ploy by the 
government, thinking they wanted to get aid money (Personal Communication, April 11, 2016). 
Rumors began flying around that once a person was taken into a treatment center, aid workers 
were harvesting people’s organs inside and selling them. Fear was another factor as SP worked 
to communicate about the disease. Besides the fact that EVD is a mystical disease and was 
killing people quickly, the way to stop the spread of it went against everything Liberian culture 
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stood for. Mothers specifically, were used to diseases like malaria and typhoid, and unfortunately 
the beginning symptoms of EVD are almost exactly like that of the aforementioned diseases. 
Mothers were being told that their children could present with these symptoms and that they 
could not help or even touch them. The research shows that what occurred was an unimaginable 
situation. Your child becomes ill, you have no way to help them, and the only thing to do is for 
you to drop them off at a center with people wearing suits who may or may not take care of them 
(besides this, they were not allowed to visit). Worse yet, most people who went to Ebola 
treatment centers were dying, and never came out because the bodies had to be disposed of. This 
was found to be another struggle with the disease spreading because it is against Liberian culture 
to cremate those that have died. This was counterintuitive in a culture that highly values taking 
care of loved ones and having a specific way to bury and honor the deceased. Paired with a lack 
of mistrust for outsiders and the government, especially while most people went to treatment 
centers and never returned, only fostered this fear and made communicating difficult at best.  
 Participants were asked about how the healthcare systems communicated during the crisis 
within Liberia. It was found that the healthcare systems and governments were, on a whole, 
unprepared. A district health official in Foya realized the devastation of EVD, but because the 
outbreak had not yet spread to other areas, there was a lack of support and supplies. No 
ambulances were available and the health official ended up coming to SP for vehicles to use. 
When the MOH finally realized how serious the outbreak was, they were unable to handle it. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) was also unprepared and did not declare an international 
disaster until August 8th, which was after thousands had become sick. In addition to this, the 
health care work force was devastated during the EVD outbreak when almost half of them died. 
They had information about the disease, but because of the skepticism and disbelief that it was 
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real, many caught it themselves while taking care of neighbors or loved ones. About half way 
through the spread, a slogan was created for the health care workers, which was “Keep safe, keep 
serving”, but unfortunately for many it was too late. Their desire to provide care outweighed the 
risk of becoming infected themselves. Before an international disaster was declared, the crisis 
exploded. Dr. Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol were diagnosed with Ebola on July 26th and at 
that time, interviewees said that SP Ebola care centers were running with about 30-35 patients. 
Each day the centers were receiving 10-15 new cases (that they even knew about) and only two 
ambulances were even available to help with delivering patients or the deceased to appropriate 
burial sites. At this point, the world began to take notice and many INGO’s began pulling out 
because they were being overwhelmed and unable to handle the influx of the sick. At this point, 
SP had to evacuate staff and rethink the appropriate course of action and how they could 
continue with communicating and treating the disease. 
 Finally, the participants were asked about how communication could have been used to 
lessen the death toll. A few of the smaller things noted were the following: the government 
helping and providing more support in Monrovia, hospitals being prepared, and hospital staff 
being able to communicate to the nurses about what to look for when an Ebola victim presented. 
Overwhelmingly, though, two key themes were discussed within the interviews. The first one 
was that the culture affected who delivered the message, the messenger was more important than 
the message itself. There are two main systems of hierarchy in Liberian culture, the government 
and the Traditional Council (chieftain system). The traditional chieftain system works alongside 
the government, but often has more power and pull amongst the people, especially the tribes, and 
rural/indigenous people. The SP staff believes that if they had accessed the Traditional Council 
sooner and used them to give the message to communities, the people would have listened. In 
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this case, Liberians would have trusted the Traditional Council and the leaders that oversaw each 
of their communities and tribes over the government. 
 And a lot of times here, it’s not so much the message, it’s the messenger. The messenger  
is the most important thing, more so than the message. So having that person that 
everyone trusts and respects give that message, they would have listened. Regardless of if 
they had known what Ebola is or was, or anything, they would have listened because it 
came from the top chief. Because that system is already put in place within this culture, 
people would have respected and listened to it regardless of if they would have 
understood it. (Int. 1, Personal Communication, March 28, 2016) 
Using the traditional chiefs, leaders, and healers to communicate the message could have helped 
slow down the spread of the disease and the fatalities that occurred because they were the most 
trusted in the community. 
 The second theme seen throughout the interviews was that information does not always 
equate to action, people make decisions based off of their motivations. Behavior change 
communication is rarely applied to public health crises, but is one of the most applicable, 
especially in regards to the Ebola crisis. A prime example of motivation was demonstrated by the 
way Liberians reacted when keeping a EVD victim at home became a punishable offense. People 
were not taking sick family members to ETU’s, so the government tried to discourage that 
behavior by punishing those that refused to comply. However, in reality the behavior did not 
change, because families didn’t want their loved ones to not be cared for attentively, to be alone, 
or to end up dying and being cremated. Liberians ultimately kept patients at home out of love for 
them and the threats given by the government about being sent to prison did not change that 
behavior. “When people are in fear, you need to communicate to them in a different way. You 
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can’t make them more fearful because that’s not going to help them, but at the same time you 
have to somehow get your point across” (Int. 1, Personal Communication, March 28, 2016). The 
motivation behind the EVD communication messages needed to be changed. 
External Communication and Awareness 
Articles collected during the crisis were analyzed and range in date from May 2, 2014 to 
February 25, 2016. Throughout the articles there is a clear shift in the communication from 
information to empowerment. The first six articles focus on external communication and 
awareness. 
 Overcoming the Fear of Ebola. The article addressed the very first response to the 
Ebola outbreak (dated only about a month after the staff first heard about EVD). Volunteers went 
out and began an awareness campaign, detailing the facts about the virus. Some communities 
rejected the volunteers and even “called them paid agents who were sent in the communities to 
spray the people and killed them” (Overcoming the Fear of Ebola, 2014). Fear and resistance 
from the Liberian people emerged at the beginning of the outbreak. 
 Wrestling with Ebola. The article was written by the leader of the SP disaster response 
team battling Ebola, Dr. Lance Plyer. Ebola removes all human touch and communication from 
those that get it. Once a person was taken to an Ebola treatment unit (ETU), they were most 
likely never seen again because they usually died. Visitors weren’t allowed in because of the risk 
of infection. “It robs the patient of their social dignity as well as their physical health. It 
marginalizes and isolates like no other sickness I know” (Wrestling with Ebola, 2014). The 
article shows just why Liberians were so afraid to bring their family members to treatment 
centers. 
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 Working Together to Contain Ebola. The article discusses a volunteer doctor’s 
experience in the ETU after arriving in Liberia. It brought to light the importance of educating 
the people about the Ebola virus and helping the people prevent it’s spread. “I have been learning 
the approach to a community awareness and education, which is critical in preventing a wider 
spread of what is already a frightening outbreak in the West African region” (Working Together 
to Contain Ebola, 2014). SP was determined to spread information about the disease, although at 
this time they did not yet know the messenger was a vitally important part of the equation. 
 Liberia’s First Ebola Survivor. The article details the story of Liberia’s first Ebola 
survivor, but comes four days before Dr. Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol are diagnosed with 
EVD. Harrison Saleka, who survived Ebola, was a prime example of how Ebola spread based on 
the cultural burial traditions for the deceased. He contracted the disease while helping to prepare 
a family member’s body for burial. During the writing of the article, the outbreak was beginning 
to spiral out of control, but SP continued to put a strong emphasis on the awareness campaign. In 
just under three months, the campaign led by staff reached 430,000 people (Liberia’s First Ebola 
Survivor, 2014). External communication to the public was pushed daily. 
 Ebola Crisis in West Africa. The article links to a video of Ken Isaacs, Vice President 
of Programs and Government Relations for SP, testifying before the House of Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee about Ebola in August (after Dr. Brantly and Nancy Writebol have been 
diagnosed). Mr. Ken Isaacs brought to light that the EVD epidemic was an international disaster 
that was out of control and uncontained. In the video, a more in-depth look at SP’s response to 
the epidemic is explained. There are 3.6 million people in Liberia and at this point over 435,000 
people had been informed through the public awareness campaign. The lack of communication 
and overall unpreparedness is seen through several things. Only two relief agencies were 
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providing all clinical care for Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, and SP owned and operated the 
only two aircrafts in the entire country, which turned a sixteen-hour road trip into a forty-minute 
helicopter ride (vital for getting lab results back on confirmed or unconfirmed EVD patients). 
The researcher also found a few key themes present in the article that were present in the 
interviews. Mr. Isaacs explains the need for informing health workers about the disease, 
clarifying that they did not possess the information to understand what Ebola was and how it 
worked. He reported that two of the most prominent physicians in Liberia openly mocked the 
existence of Ebola and went to a hospital to treat patients. Within five days, both of them had 
contracted EVD and died. It was also stated that there was a huge need for general public 
awareness because the cultural traditions of burying the dead, such as kissing the corpse, were 
contributing to the spread of the disease. The theme of public awareness is continually seen. 
 Keeping Up the Fight Against Ebola. Samaritan’s Purse staff expanded the awareness 
campaign to Lofa, Gabarpolu, and River Gee, which were close to the border of Guinea (where 
EVD crossed over from). The article, released on September 8, 2014 contained new numbers on 
the progression of the awareness campaign. Over 8,000 church leaders were educated (collective 
reach of 200,000), in addition to the 450,000 people that were reached through flyers, radio 
spots, and community events (Keeping Up the Fight Against Ebola, 2014). These numbers had a 
large impact, but it was noted that those reached only accounted for ten percent of the Liberian 
population. Lastly, the article continues to emphasize the fact that many citizens are still in fear 
or denial, even though the death toll from EVD was over 2,000 (Keeping Up the Fight Against 
Ebola, 2014). 
 The first six articles presented the massive public awareness campaign that Samaritan’s 
Purse undertook, highlighting fear and denial among the Liberians, as well as the need for health 
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workers and the public to be educated. The next eight articles shift from delivering information 
to empowering and teaching the Liberian people. 
Samaritan’s Purse Airlifts Relief Supplies to West Africa for New Effort in Fight 
Against Ebola.  This article is the first of many where we see that SP has regrouped after Dr. 
Brantly and Nancy Writebol became sick. External communication is still the focus, but has 
turned to empowering the people instead of just trying to spread information. The article explains 
that SP can no longer keep up with the amount of people seeking care for EVD. In addition to 
this, so many citizens have died, and the people were still fearful of seeking treatment, 
highlighting the fact that denial was taking a toll on the country. A 747 jet was filled with 100 
tons of rubber gloves, face masks, rubber boots, and disinfectants for people. “To help these 
families, Samaritan’s Purse has developed a community-based care program to train and equip 
people to care for their loved ones and protect themselves from the deadly disease” (SP Airlifts 
Relief Supplies to West Africa for New Effort in Fight Against Ebola, 2014). 
Ebola Supplies Being Distributed in Liberia. The article provides a more thorough 
understanding of what the purpose of SP’s new approach is to handling EVD. The 747 jet that 
had been delivered was itself a symbol of the new strategy. It explained that part of the new 
program was to supervise Community Care Centers in the hardest hit areas, and to train 
Liberians to run 10-bed facilities in more remote areas of the country (Ebola Supplies Being 
Distributed in Liberia, 2014). SP also created protection and control kits for families. “Each kit 
includes rubber gloves, a bucket, soap, disinfectant, and a specific disinfectant for treating 
drinking water” (Ebola Supplies Being Distributed in Liberia, 2014). In addition to both of these 
new initiatives, caregiver kits were created, so that people could take care of their loved ones if 
they could not make it to an ETU. The kits were packed with protective clothing, hydration 
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items, medicines, and disinfectant. The public awareness campaign is mentioned at the end of the 
article and at the time (October 5, 2014) 450,000 people had been educated on Ebola, with just as 
more religious leaders being reached (with a reach of 450,000 themselves). 
Samaritan’s Purse Launches Bold New Initiative to Combat Ebola. This article is a 
press release discussing how SP trained caregivers to provide loved ones with care. The kit 
contained illustrated step by step instructions on how to take care of those that had EVD, 
including the supplies necessary to do so. The kits primarily went to specific villages along the 
River Gee, where there were no ETU’s or Community Care Centers. Dr. Kent Brantly said, “If 
we don’t provide education and protective equipment to caregivers, we will be condemning 
countless numbers of mothers, fathers, daughters and sons to death because they chose not to let 
their loved ones die alone” (2014). This further highlights the theme the researcher sees with fear 
and the need the people had for awareness. 
Fighting Ebola in West Africa. This article gives a breakdown of all the different 
initiatives SP provided up to this point in time (October 21, 2014). It gave viewers more 
information about the infection prevention and control kits that were given to the public. SP 
handed out kits that contained gloves, soap, buckets, and a disinfectant for treating drinking 
water. “Our focus will be on educating 300,000 people in high transmission areas across multiple 
counties throughout the country” (Fighting Ebola in West Africa, 2014). Lastly, the article 
discussed the continuation of spreading Ebola information and awareness. 
Putting Out the Fires of Ebola in Liberia. This article addressed the commitment of SP 
to helping the Liberian people be free of the Ebola disease. Beyond that, it highlights the fact that 
fear and denial were still rampant among many of the citizens. “In addition to the threat of the 
disease itself, there are still many who remain in denial about Ebola. Others are deeply 
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mistrustful of outsiders and refuse to accept our assistance, even becoming hostile” (Putting Out 
the Fires of Ebola in Liberia, 2014). As stated above through the interviews, hostility was 
common when going to reach out to people. Lastly, a process was given for responding to hot 
spot communities. Once the staff learned about a break out in a certain area, they went to assess, 
to see how many people had Ebola already and if the citizens living there were open to receiving 
help. Each household in the area then received an infection and prevention kit. After this, the 
team would address those that were already stricken with Ebola. They were directed to the 
nearest ETU or given the choice of two other different types of facilities. “If such a facility isn’t 
close – which is likely, since there are only eight in the country-then community members are 
given the choice between a small mobile care center and home-based care training” (Putting Out 
the Fires of Ebola in Liberia, 2014). At the point in which the article was written (November 25, 
2016) SP had already built two community care centers and educated 26,000 Liberian people by 
passing out 10,000 hygiene kits since October.  
Ebola Response Update.  The article, written in February of 2015, gives a run down of 
the work SP continued to do, the numbers of those infected, and where it was expected to head. 
It is important to note that of the three countries affected by EVD (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea), Liberia had the largest amount of life taken, with 4,800 people dying from the deadly 
virus. The most important research reported from this article though, is the fact that the people 
are cited as recognizing Ebola as a real disease. “Probably most significantly, the attitudes and 
actions of the Liberian people began to change. In order to survive the outbreak, certain cultural 
practices (specifically regarding burials) were relinquished” (Ebola Response Update, 2015). 
This article is one of the first times behavior change is reported. 
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Samaritan’s Purse Honored in Liberia. This article, written on August 6, 2015, 
highlights Samaritan’s Purse as being the only international organization to receive awards and 
be honored by the Liberian government. SP was awarded the Global Image award and Dr. 
Brantly was awarded the Grand Commander grade of the Order of the Star of Africa award. In 
addition to this, they were invited to the Presidential Independence Day Celebration. By this 
time, most of the media frenzy had ceased to exist around Ebola, even though the disease was 
still present. SP continued their work in Liberia through “psychosocial counseling and health 
visitations, post-Ebola recovery, health programming, and overseeing the Foya Transit Center” 
(Samaritan’s Purse Honored in Liberia, 2015). 
Ebola Memorial Cemetery Dedicated in Liberia. The article highlights the fact that 
Samaritan’s Purse consistently went above and beyond, and that Liberia was declared Ebola free. 
SP specifically ran an Ebola Treatment Unit in Foya, Liberia during the outbreak. As Ebola 
ravaged the area, many people’s lives were taken. A special piece of land was given for the 
purpose of burials and after the disease slowed down, it acted as a mass graveyard for two 
hundred and fifty-one people. However, none of the people’s families had been able to have a 
funeral for their loved ones, say good-bye, or properly bury their family members. The mass 
grave was covered with tall grass, overrun by vegetation, and in no way a place where family 
members could visit deceased loves ones. Samaritan’s Purse, in conjunction with the Foya 
District, decided that the lost should be remembered. Over the course of two months, SP 
transformed the site into the Ebola Memorial Cemetery, complete with a fence, gate, and marble 
headstones for each of the lost. This action not only honored all those that so bravely fought 
against EVD, but also gave Liberians a chance to be able to properly grieve for their family 
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members and friends. A dedication ceremony was held to commemorate the area, where Joseph 
N. Boakai, Liberia’s Vice President talked about the impact of SP.  
It truly brings me deep personal pride and fulfillment to be associated with such a gesture 
in humanity that uplifts the spirit. Thank you Samaritan’s Purse! You are indeed 
contributing to reshaping and refining the moral, psychological, spiritual, and emotional 
makeup of our society. (Ebola Memorial Cemetery Dedicated in Liberia, 2016) 
For the third and hopefully final time, Liberia was declared Ebola free in January of this year. 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
 The discussion chapter will directly answer the research questions presented at the 
beginning of this study. It will seek to show how Coomb’s situational crisis communication 
theory relates to the Ebola crisis and in what ways the researcher sees direct correlations. In 
addition to this, the chapter will discuss the limitations of the study and the need for future 
research on the topic. It is important to note that in order to answer the way in which Coomb’s 
theory correlated to the crisis, a thorough understanding of the crisis and response was needed. 
How did the healthcare systems communicate about Ebola? 
The Ministry of Health and the hospitals in Liberia were, on a whole, underprepared and 
not capable of handling the Ebola epidemic. Based off of the interviews completed by the 
researcher, it was found that many INGO’s partnered with the MOH in Liberia and health 
districts to spread information and awareness about the disease. The MOH mostly coordinated 
and approved the information being disseminated. However, it was realized too late that EVD 
needed to be dealt with seriously. This was shown in the lack of communication to the caregivers 
and doctors of the country. The communication between the healthcare systems and those that 
were in the trenches, fighting the disease, was not clear. Nurses were not given proper instruction 
about what to do when someone with Ebola presented, and in addition, there was a lack of 
supplies for them to treat those that came in. Without the proper personal protective equipment 
and transportation needs, like ambulances, those that worked this epidemic were doomed from 
the beginning. Karin Huster (2016), the clinical lead of an ETU with Doctors Without Borders, 
reports that throughout the EVD crisis, over 800 healthcare workers contracted Ebola and out of 
that, more than 500 died. The other contributing factor to this was that because of a deep mistrust 
of the government, many doctors and healthcare workers did not believe Ebola was real. They 
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believed that the government wanted to line their pockets with the money of the aid 
organizations, which further fed into their thinking that it did not exist (Int. 2, Personal 
Communication, 2016). In an article entitled “Knowledge Practices and Their Durability in Post-
War and Post-Ebola Liberia” an example of a doctor displays this very problem. Kauffeldt et. al 
(2015) spoke about a “doctor” going on the radio about a cure for EVD saying that “a god 
revealed the right medicine for Ebola to him in a dream. He used chalk and leaves as medications 
and he organized a team and opened a traditional ETU in Ganta”. Over the course of the next 
two weeks, the entire team contracted Ebola and sadly, most of them died. This distrust, for the 
government, combined with the cultural practices of the people, helped EVD spiral out of 
control. “Since there was rampant distrust of the government anyway, a renewed reliance on 
tradition developed in Liberia and Liberians continued their normal practices for treating the 
sick” (Kauffeldt et al., 2016).  
Another finding that is important to note, was that the infrastructure of the country simply 
did not set Liberia up for the ability to be able to respond. Huster (2016), noted “Three of the 
poorest, most dysfunctional governments in the world were left much too long to manage on 
their own the biggest outbreak of a dangerous infectious disease, one that spread across the 
borders like wildfire”. The country found themselves in a position that resulted in the death of 
over 4,800 Liberian people. “Poor countries that lack roads and other essential infrastructure are 
most susceptible but least able to withstand the assaults of diseases or wars on their populations” 
(Huster, 2016). The senator of Lofa Country in Liberia, at a memorial service for those that lost 
their lives even said, “We were ignorant, that is why we lost so many people to this disease” 
(Ebola Memorial Center Dedicated in Liberia, 2016). Infrastructure, coupled with the mistrust of 
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the government and cultural practices greatly determined the response of the healthcare systems 
in Liberia to EVD. 
How did the non-profit Samaritan’s Purse respond to this crisis? 
 Throughout the two-year crisis of EVD, Samaritan’s Purse remained faithful to fight for 
the Liberian people, never wavering from remaining in the trenches to treat the people and 
provide them with dignity in their last days. The interviews and articles that were analyzed 
provide readers with a more thorough understanding of how Samaritan’s Purse responded and 
what action they took. For quick reference, the below chart gives a brief overview and timeline 
of SP’s response to EVD. 
Timeline of SP Response to Ebola Crisis 
March 2014 SP staff learns about EVD crossing into 
Liberia 
Two days later, Ebola 
messaging is put into programs 
June 2014 Messaging is continued within SP programs 
and into the communities 
First Ebola patient presents at 
ELWA Hospital 
July 2014 SP treats EVD patients, Dr. Brantly & 
Nancy Writebol contract Ebola 
430,000 people have been 
reached by EVD messaging 
August 2014 Expat staff is evacuated, Ken Isaacs testifies 
before the House of Foreign Affairs 
435,000 people have been 
reached, Brantly survives 
September 2014 Community Care based program was 
developed 
450,000 people have been 
reached 
October 2014 50,000 prevention & control kits and 3,000 
caregiver kits are distributed 
Focus on educating 300,000 
more Liberians in high 
transmission areas 
November 2014 Construction begins on 15 Community Care 
Centers 
Messaging and education 
continues 
February 2015 Attitudes and actions of Liberians have 
noticeably started to change 
1.5 million Liberians have 
received Ebola education 
May 2015 Leadership training begins – psychosocial 
counseling, evangelism, & discipleship 
1.6 million have been educated 
August 2015 SP is honored with the the Global Image 
Award 
Post Ebola recovery work 
January 2016 Liberia is declared Ebola free  
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Pre-Crisis 
Before the crisis, Samaritan’s Purse did not take any specific actions, which was because of the 
fact that as one interviewee said, “Ebola wasn’t even on our radar!” (Interview 1, Personal 
Communication, 2016). However, SP did already have a long-standing history within the country 
of Liberia. They were well known and respected before the crisis occurred, which helped bolster 
their reputation as they began to respond. 
Crisis 
Samaritan’s Purse learned about Ebola in late March of 2014. Upon hearing of the disease, they 
immediately sought out action. Although the first case of EVD had not yet come to Liberia, they 
responded by putting Ebola messaging into each of their current programs, attending daily 
meetings with the MOH and other INGO’s, and sending staff out to blanket the surrounding 
communities they served in. As the disease ramped up, so did the response.  From June to 
October 2014, they took over an ETU originally built and run by MSF, treating as many as 30-35 
patients daily, with another 10-15 new cases presenting each day at the treatment centers. By this 
point, radio messaging had been developed, the staff continued to spread awareness by walking 
through communities with megaphones, and they continued to speak with anyone that would 
listen to them about the dangers of Ebola. By this time, SP had educated 430,000 people through 
Ebola messaging. Then, in July of 2014, Dr. Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol were infected 
with EVD. This was a huge hit to the organization, as they worked for days treating these staff 
members and trying to arrange a way for them to be medevaced back to the United States. 
Suddenly, the world began to pay attention to the crisis that had been raging on in West Africa, 
which had for the most part been ignored. Media headlines and news stories everywhere broke 
out into an Ebola craze. Attention from the international community had been needed from the 
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beginning, especially since SP was nearly alone in their fight against Ebola, as Doctors Without 
Borders was the only other organization on the ground. Huster (2016) writes, “But for those of us 
on the front lines from the early days, face to face with Ebola and its deaths, ‘slow’ seemed too 
kind a word for the world’s response. ‘Cowardly’ and ‘non-existent’ come closer”. It was 
appropriate then at this point, that Ken Isaacs, Vice President of Programs and Government 
Relations at Samaritan’s Purse had the opportunity to testify in front of the House of Foreign 
Affairs. He gave a moving message, discussing what the response had been to the outbreak and 
showcasing the desperate need for the international community to wake up and move into action 
to help West Africa. 
In the same month, SP made the decision to pull all expat staff from Liberia. Ebola 
became nearly uncontrollable and the Liberian people were devastated by loss, fear, and denial, 
which resulted in riots and a safety concern for staff members. EVD was overwhelming the 
country and it was a large burden to bear, so the decision to pull staff gave the organization time 
to reassess and develop a new response to the outbreak. At the time of doing this though, 
“450,000 people were reached through flyers, posters, community events, and other activities”, 
including those who heard radio spots on air” (Keeping Up the Fight Against Ebola, 2014). 
However, despite the risks and challenges, Samaritan’s Purse was back in country in the 
next two months. As noted in the results, by September, a new plan was rolled out, with a clear 
shift from getting information out to empowerment. The new initiatives that would begin to be 
implemented displayed the need for messaging to come from a different perspective. The first 
initiative that came out was the building of fifteen Community Care Centers. SP began building 
these centers (the first opened in December) so that those sick with Ebola could receive basic 
care. The 10-bed facilities were supervised by SP staff and run by Liberians that had been trained 
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(Ebola Supplies Being Distributed in Liberia, 2014). The second initiative was the distribution of 
50,000 prevention and control kits that contained rubber gloves, a bucket, soap, disinfectant, and 
a treatment for drinking water. The goal was to reach 300,000 people through a massive 
awareness campaign, helping them to prevent the spread of the disease through proper hygiene 
and sanitation (Ebola Supplies Being Distributed in Liberia, 2014). The third initiative was the 
distribution of 3,000 caregiver kits that included protective clothing, hydration items, medicines, 
and disinfectant. These kits were created for “interim home-based interventions in cases where 
infected community members cannot go to an Ebola Treatment Unit (largest service provider) or 
a Community Care Center” (Ebola Supplies Being Distributed, 2014). All three of these 
initiatives were pushed out in October. Then, in February of 2015 behavior and actions finally 
began to change, aiding the slowing of the disease.  
Post-Crisis 
By May of 2015, 1.6 million Liberians had been educated through the mass awareness 
campaign. In addition to supporting the Community Care Centers, SP provided leadership 
trainings, which encompassed psychosocial counseling, evangelism, and discipleship (Ebola Free 
in Liberia, 2015). They also developed special programs with health messaging for children and 
trained staff in counseling so that they could minister to other Liberians. Samaritan’s Purse not 
only fought against EVD, but worked and is still working to help the Liberian people post EVD. 
Bev Kauffeldt, who has worked alongside her husband in Liberia for eleven years noted, 
“Leveraging our experiences and relationships, credibility with the government, a robust church 
network, and aviation services, Samaritan’s Purse has the ability to act quickly and nimbly. This 
is what sets us apart as an organization” (Ebola Free in Liberia, 2015). Finally, in January of 
2016, Liberia was officially declared Ebola free. 
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Viewed through the lens of Coomb’s theory, Samaritan’s Purse is categorized as being in 
the victim crisis cluster. This cluster specifically includes natural disasters and contributes very 
low responsibility to the organization itself (Carroll, 2013). The organization had no control over 
this event and was not at fault, so therefore their reputation was safe. Because the organization 
was in the victim cluster, they did not necessarily choose a strategy of denying, diminishing, or 
rebuilding. However, as an organization they did an excellent job of instructing and adjusting 
after the crisis. Coombs (2015) notes, “Instructing information focuses on telling stakeholders 
what to do to protect themselves physically in the crisis”. Whenever a crisis hits, people are 
always the main concern and in reality, the most important priority. Based on interviews that the 
researcher conducted, SP immediately used instructing information. Within forty-eight hours of 
hearing about EVD, the SP team in Liberia did research and implemented information on EVD 
prevention into each of their current programs, as well as beginning an awareness campaign in 
surrounding communities. In addition to instructing, they also provided adjusting information 
post-crisis. Traumatic experiences naturally induce high levels of stress, and when the 
organization is dealing with the loss of life, this becomes worse. “Traumatic stress incidents 
overwhelm a person’s ability to cope” (Coombs, 2015). The organization trained their staff 
members in counseling, and equipped local leaders on how to help their fellow citizens post 
EVD. Both of these actions taken by the organization proved to further bolster the organization’s 
reputation among the Liberian people. Although not responsible for the terrible crisis, SP took 
the proper steps to keep those affected aware of the situation and informed (even if they did not 
listen to the message at first). 
In what ways could Coomb’s theory have been used to more effectively communicate so 
that the overall outcome and loss was changed? 
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 Throughout the EVD epidemic, over 11,000 people’s lives were claimed. Out of those 
11,000, Liberia was the hardest hit of the countries that were overwhelmed. In Liberia, 4,800 
people succumbed to the disease. But could this have been prevented? Could the loss of life have 
been so below what it was? The researcher believes that Coomb’s SCCT theory could have been 
directly applied to the crisis so as to prevent further loss of human life. 
 First, the government, although unstable, needed to be prepared. In the precrisis stage, the 
government did not listen to the warning signs. EVD began in Guinea, so health officials did 
have a small amount of time to create a plan. The difficulty in this particular crisis was that no 
one knew what the disease was, and because they did not know, they had no idea what 
precautions to take. A doctor in Liberia wisely said, “You have to know Ebola to fight Ebola. 
Mobilize your people” (Origins of the 2014 epidemic, 2015). The first alert about EVD came on 
January 24, 2014, the MOH issued their first alert on March 13th and by March 21st a scientist in 
France with WHO was able to determine what the disease was. By March 23rd, twenty-nine 
people had already died in Guinea (Origins of the 2014 epidemic, 2014). At this time, all 
precautions should have been taken. The amount of deaths was a paracrisis, a specific warning 
sign that the possibility for a full-blown crisis was brewing. The borders should have been locked 
down and had this been done, the disease may have only raged in Guinea. Although difficult to 
restrict the movement of so many people, this small preventative measure could have saved 
thousands. In addition, messaging and steps for a possible outbreak needed to be developed 
immediately following the initial alert of an unknown disease and release of alert by the MOH. 
This crisis also clearly displays the importance of crisis history and prior reputation. The 
government was already on unstable ground with it’s citizens because of the civil war that had 
ravaged the country. As an organization so to speak, they already had a history of crisis and a 
A COMMUNICATIVE RESPONSE FROM SAMARITAN’S PURSE 63 
reputation for mistrust. Because of the fragile mistrust that existed, it was incredibly difficult for 
the citizens of Liberia to trust any information that was being released about EVD. The 
researcher believes that the MOH and government needed to employ the rebuilding strategy 
provided by Coomb’s theory. It was quite evident that the past of the civil war was in the 
forefront of the Liberian people’s minds. Although eleven years had passed between the civil 
war and EVD, the atrocities committed and deep seated fear and mistrust still existed. The 
government and the MOH needed to attempt to reassure citizens that the information they were 
communicating about was indeed, very real and important.  In addition to this, there was not a 
clear line of communication from the MOH to doctors to nurses working in the hospitals. So 
many health care workers lost their lives because there was not clear communication about the 
precautions that needed to be taken. According to SCCT theory, people should always be the 
first priority in a crisis and this was clearly not the case. 
The researcher discovered in the process that SCCT was not the best theory for this crisis 
situation. In hindsight, this research question is difficult to answer because the responsibility for 
the outbreak does not rest on any one person or organization. The MOH and Samaritan’s Purse 
had a responsibility within their response, but did not necessarily take on any denying, 
diminishing, or rebuilding strategies. 
Limitations of Study 
This mixed methods study presented several different limitations. First, the researcher 
desired to go to the country of Liberia and get first hand accounts from citizens regarding the 
communication process during the outbreak. However, this hinged on an internship opportunity 
that was proved to be unsafe based on the fact that the Ebola crisis was still raging during the 
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summer of 2015. The researcher believes that having this first hand account and the perspective 
of Liberian citizens would have greatly enriched the body of research.  
Secondly, 15-20 interviews were to be conducted with health professionals and aid 
workers, which proved to be far too many for the researcher to obtain and conduct. The other 
limitation that was run into in regards to interviews was that quite a few of the possible 
interviewees did not have time to respond to the invitation based on their busy work schedules. It 
was found to be much harder to contact these individuals than anticipated. 
A third limitation found was the lack of information in the articles written by Samaritan’s 
Purse. The researcher had hoped to find a much more detailed description of the communication 
process within the articles, however the interviews did help to provide much deeper insight and 
information. 
A fourth limitation was that the crisis was an uncontrolled incident, which made it 
difficult to assign responsibility. The organization and MOH had responsibility within the 
response, but did not have responsibility for the outbreak itself. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 The are various opportunities for further research with this topic. Behavioral change 
communication could be directly applied to the response of this outbreak. It was clearly seen that 
in this case, the person delivering the message was far more important than the message itself. 
Information did not equate to action, which had a devastating affect on the response to EVD. An 
in-depth look at this crisis combining public health theory and communication could greatly 
enhance the research that details the response to the outbreak. 
 Another area of research that could be looked into is the role that culture played in the 
outbreak. The most effective prevention behaviors to combat the disease were hindered by the 
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deep-seated cultural practices, customs, and traditions of the Liberian people. Understanding 
how to properly communicate interculturally was key and could add to the body of research. 
Conclusion 
 Based on this study, we can take away a few key findings. The first is that the healthcare 
systems in Liberia were not adequately prepared or equipped to handle the Ebola crisis. Effective 
communication messaging was not put into place soon enough and proper protocols were not put 
in place to contain EVD to one area. The communication provided to the hospitals and the health 
care workers was not sufficient and there was a lack of proper supplies and protective equipment. 
The lack of mistrust between the government and the Liberian citizens only served to further 
irritate the situation, causing rumors that aid workers were infecting people with Ebola and 
harvesting their organs at the ETU’s. This mistrust resulted in people not believing that EVD was 
real, causing further spread of the disease. In addition to this, the values and traditions of the 
culture went against every prevention and control method given, which made it increasingly 
difficult to keep EVD contained. It was also found that the healthcare systems and MOH could 
have better utilized the stages of Coomb’s theory. There were warning signs before the crisis 
occurred, even if it only gave them a small amount of lead time to develop effective messaging. 
 Secondly, we can see that as an organization, Samaritan’s Purse appropriately responded 
to the crisis. According to Coomb’s SCCT theory, the non-profit was a victim and not 
responsible for what occurred. However, they immediately provided instructing and adjusting 
information per SCCT that helped to save lives. Within forty-eight hours of hearing about EVD, 
messaging was developed and put into all current programs. As the disease spiraled, SP did 
everything they possibly could to deter the infection. Over the course of the next year and a half, 
SP began running an ETU, developed a mass awareness campaign that reached 1.6 million 
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Liberians, built four Community Care Centers, airlifted 200 tons of relief supplies, provided 
50,000 prevention and control kits to families, and gave out 3,000 caregiver kits so that Liberians 
could safely care for their sick loved ones. Samaritan’s Purse was one of only two INGO’s that 
stayed to combat EVD. They created a clear messaging plan and course of action, responding 
effectively and quickly to do what they could to prevent further loss of life. 
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